Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much by Resnik, Judith
COMMENTARY
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
ARTICLE III: TOO LITTLE
AND TOO MUCH*
JUDIH RESNIK**
I. TWENTIETH CENTURY TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE KINDS,
PLACES, AND ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL JUDGING
The contemporary conversation about judicial independence does not
much attend to transformations in the structure and function of the federal
judiciary in the United States or to the proliferation of various kinds of
federal judges. My contribution to this symposium is therefore to sketch
some of the salient changes and to consider how they affect discussions of
judicial independence.
The idea of change is also central to the article by Dr. Frances
Zemans, 1 whom I have been asked to follow. With characteristic thought-
fulness, and relying on a mixture of empiricism and analysis, Dr. Zemans
urges readers to consider the distinctions between decisional independence
and institutional independence as well as the differing settings of Article
III and non-life-tenured judges.2 Her central argument is that judges
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1. See Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72
S. CAL. L. REv. 625 (1999).
2. See id. at 628-54.
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should change the way they express-if not the way that they think
about-judicial independence. Dr. Zemans proposes that judges relate to
the public through a variety of means, including through the media, by
education, and in their written decisions. She also suggests that judges
deploy different "voices,"3 less arrogant, more explanatory, and more
readily accessible.
4
The changes, occurring over this century, that are my focus alter the
common depictions of the federal judiciary. Start with life tenure. Dr.
Zemans' essay complains that much of the rhetoric of judicial independ-
ence erroneously equates life tenure with independence. As she points out,
Article Ill often serves as the paradigm for judicial independence.
5
I agree that consideration of judicial independence should not center
exclusively on life tenure, but my attention does not shift solely to state
courts, in which most judges do not have life tenure. Instead, I return to
the federal system, which is increasingly populated with non-life-tenured
judges. In United States trial courts today, about 850 district judges
(holding either active or senior status) have life tenure; I call these judges
federal "constitutional judges." 6 These 850 trial judges are joined by an
almost equal number (about 7707) of other federal judges, magistrate and
bankruptcy judges (federal "statutory judges"), serving fixed (and renew-
able) terms, and appointed by life-tenured judges.8 In terns of sheer num-
3. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, INA DIFERENT VOICE (1982).
4. See Zemans, supra note 1, at 642.
5. See Zemans, supra note 1, at 628.
6. See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNrrED STATES COURTS 33 tbl.12, (1998) [hereinafter 1997 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting 647
authorized judgeships, 69 vacancies, and 278 senior judges).
7. See id. at 34-35 tbls.13 & 14. As of September 1997, 326 bankruptcy positions were
authorized, with 313 filled and another 22 "recalled" judges serving that court. See id. There were
432 full-time magistrate judges and 75 part-time magistrate judges serving, for a combined total of
767 full-time statutory judges. See id.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1), (b) (1994) (requiring appellate judges of each circuit to appoint
bankruptcy judges for 14-year terms); id. § 63 1(a), (e) (requiring district judges to appoint magistrate
judges for eight-year terms).
As Professor Daniel Klerman pointed out in his oral comments at the symposium, a promotion
system is evolving in the federal judiciary, in which a statutory judgeship (magistrate or bankruptcy)
becomes a route to a constitutional judgeship and a lower court judgeship becomes a route to, and
increasingly a requirement for, a higher court judgeship. See Daniel Klerman, Comments at the Judi-
cial Independence and Accountability Symposium at USC Law School, Program & Webcast Archive
(last modified Nov. 21, 1998) <http:lwww.usc.eduldeptllaw/>. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
judicial clerkships have also begun to follow a similar pattern, whereby recent graduates go first to an
appellate court before to the Supreme Court, and some district court clerks proceed to an appellate
court clerkship.
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bers, the docket of the non-tenured judges far exceeds that of the life-
tenured judges. 9
And those are not the only federal judges of relevance. Almost 1,400
judges work in agencies, such as the Social Security Administration, the
Securities Exchange Commission, and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.10 These administrative law judges ("ALJs") decide a volume
of cases comparable to that of the life-tenured judiciary." In addition to
ALJs, yet another group of federal judges exist who are, in one commenta-
tor's view, the "hidden judiciary."'12 Some 2,000 such judges-sometimes
called "presiding officers," sometimes "administrative judges," sometimes
"hearing officers" or "examiners"-work with federal agencies but with-
out the classification as an ALJ as specified by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. '3
Given these hundreds of "federal judges," created by statute without
constitutional protections, Dr. Zemans might chastise those commentators
9. In 1997, 1,367,364 bankruptcy petitions were filed. See Judicial Business of the United
States Courts 1997 tbl.F (visited Mar. 24, 1997) <http:lwww.courts.gov/dirrpt98/index.html>. Mag-
istrate judges handled more than 500,000 matters. See id. at tbl.S-19.
10. As of September 30, 1997, 1,387 administrative law judges ("AI.s") were assigned to fed-
eral agencies. See U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics, Oc-
cupations of Federal White-Collar and Blue-Collar Workers as of Sept. 30, 1997, 100-01 tbl.W-E
(1998). See also Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA
L. REv. 1341, 1343 (1992) (noting that as of the early 1990s, about 1,200 AL~s were "assigned to
more than 30 agencies," and ALJs' numbers were then "approximately equivalent to the number of
judges on the federal trial bench").
11. Measuring the workload volume is difficult given that the kinds of disputes, the numbers of
parties, and that the complexity of cases varies from agency to agency and from agency to court. One
commentator has concluded that "ALJs probably decide more 'cases' each year than do their federal
judicial counterparts." Verkuil, supra note 10, at 1341.
In the 1997-98 fiscal year, ALs in the Social Security Administration handled 500,000 cases and
the Appeals Council considered 101,000 appeals. See Social Sec. Admin. (SSA), About SSA's Office
of Hearings and Appeals (visited Dec. 11, 1998) <http://www.ssa.gov.oha/overview.htm>. In fiscal
year 1998, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") received 12,218 requests for
administrative hearings and resolved 7,494 appeals. In addition, the EEOC receives about 75,000
charges annually, with 48,000 discrimination charges getting resolved through state and local pro-
grams. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Enforcement Activities (visited Dec. 11,
1998) <http://www.eeoc.gov/enforce.html>.
12. Verkuil, supra note 10, at 1341.
13. See id. at 1345-46 (discussing judges who exist outside of the protections of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (the "APA"), and who, according to a 1989 survey conducted by the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States, decided about 350,000 cases). The largest set of cases (about
150,000) were decided by immigration "administrative judges," employed by the Department of Jus-
tice. The Department of Health and Human services relied on "presiding officers employed by insur-
ance carriers ... [to decide] 68,000 cases per year;" and the Department of Veterans Affairs handled
58,000 cases. Id. at 1346. Those agencies' judges employed "procedures that range from the equiva-
lent of formal APA hearings to informal processes from which there is no appeal." Id. at 1347.
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who equate judicial independence with life tenure for ignoring not only
state judges but many "federal judges" as well. Moreover, those who in-
voke "the federal model" of judicial independence should now clarify
whether the reference is to the life-tenured federal judiciary, to the statu-
tory federal judiciary sitting within Article Ill and serving renewable
terms, or to the administrative federal judiciary serving within agencies
and only sometimes falling under the Administrative Procedure Act.
The creation of tiers of federal judges could not have occurred with-
out evolution of doctrine about who can be a "federal judge." The con-
gressional authorization over this century of these new federal judge-
ships-magistrate, bankruptcy, ALJs, hearing officers-has been
challenged by litigants arguing their "right" to an Article III judge who
enjoys life tenure and a guaranteed salary. The statutory schemes provid-
ing for alternative federal judges have thus required life-tenured judges to
interpret the requirements of Article ImI.
Pause for a moment to think about the stakes. Plainly, the experience
in the United States of judging does not depend on life tenure. That is the
point of several commentators, Dr. Zemans included, who urge us to focus
on state court judges. 14 Yet in the federal system, Article Ill authorizes not
only judging but also (as Robert Stevens points out 15) the creation of an
entire branch of government. On paper, that branch is notably weak-no
budget, no courthouses, no lower federal judgeships, and few clear juris-
dictional mandates-thus prompting the characterization of the federal ju-
diciary as a "dependent judiciary."'
16
However, Article III has within it one (potential) safety net: a combi-
nation of life tenure and protected salaries for those who achieve the status
of "federal judge." Those judges hold the power of federal adjudication
free of threats-either popular or governmental. One might therefore ex-
pect that life-tenured judges would have been fierce guardians of their dis-
tinctive mandates, not only as a means of reading texts but also as a
"bulwark" to protect-and perhaps enhance-their power. Life-tenured
judges might have therefore read Article I's text to prohibit or to curtail
14. See Zemans, supra note 1, at 628-32. See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 331-335 (1999); Kathyrn Abrams, Some Realism
About Electoralism: The Case of Judicial Campaign Financing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 505, 512-15
(1999); Deborah R. Hensler, Do We Need an Empirical Research Agenda on Judicial Independence?,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 712-13 (1999).
15. See Robert Stevens, The Independence of the Judiciary: The Case of England, 72 S. CAL.
L. REV. 597 (1999).
16. John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independ-
ence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 376 (1999).
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assignment of federal adjudicatory activities to non-Article I judges.
Such an interpretation would also have put pressure on Congress to in-
crease the numbers of life-tenured judges to meet adjudicatory demands,
thus increasing the ranks of life-tenured judges.
But as is well known, that is not this country's story. Instead, life-
tenured judges have read the Constitution to permit the transfer of many
tasks of federal judging to non-life-tenured judges. 7 Both case law and
other judicial commentary 18 by life-tenured judges approve and encourage
Congress to expand the non-Article III judiciary, which now decides a host
of cases at both the trial and appellate levels. 19 The physical embodiment
of this shift in authority can be seen in federal courthouse construction. In
buildings, such as the one that my symposium co-panelist, the Honorable
Nancy Gertner, now occupies,20 magistrate judges' courtrooms are not
only built into the design, but their dimensions-like the powers of magis-
trate judges-have increased. The 1997 design manual for construction of
federal courthouses requires that magistrate judge courtrooms be larger
than before, growing from 1,500 to 1,800 square feet.
21
17. See the evolution from Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), permitting initial factfinding
by a hearing officer but retaining Article Ill authority to review jurisdictional facts de novo, to Com-
modities Future Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), upholding the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission's jurisdiction to decide related state claims. See generally Judith Resnik, The
Mythic Meaning ofArticle III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581 (1981).
18. See infra notes 32,35,43-44 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1994) (creating the bankruptcy appellate panels
("BAPS")). Some commentary has suggested that protection of Article III "values" requires that a
litigant have access-if not initially, at least eventually-to a life-tenured judge to provide appellate
review. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article
11I, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988). While many statutes provide such access in theory, in practice,
layers of non-Article III judges review each others' work, making such access not only statistically
rare but also in some instances unavailable. For example, of 1,367,364 bankruptcy filings in 1997,
only 1,362 (approximately one-tenth of one percent) were reviewed on appeal. See Judicial Business
of the United States Courts 1997, supra note 9, at tbl.S-14. See generally Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.,
The Case Against Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 4 GEO. MASONL. REv. 1 (1995).
For an example of the absence of a right of appeal from other federal decisionmakers, see Thomas
v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (upholding provisions in the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act which commit final decisionmaking, absent claims of
fraud, to arbitration).
20. The opening of this courthouse, designed by Harry Cobb and incorporating 21 wall panels
by Ellsworth Kelly, occurred on September 23, 1998. See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, The
Iconic Courtroom (paper presented at the Art and Architecture in Public Spaces Symposium held in
conjunction with the opening of the Federal Courthouse for the First Circuit, Boston, Mass.) (Sept. 23,
1998) (on file with author).
21. For the new requirements, see SECURITY AND FACILITIES COMM. OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COURT DESIGN GUIDE, available from the U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Accession No. PB97-152466, at 4-41. That guide was first published in 1991. See id. The
current guide also details the prior space requirements. See id.
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The courtrooms-or hearing rooms-of administrative law judges are
not so large, but their existence is important to the discussion of judicial
independence. Not only have the numbers and tiers of federal judges in-
creased, but the actual locations of federal adjudication have diversified.
"Courts" are now located not only in federal courthouses, but also inside
agencies' buildings. While these agency courts do not look much like the
picturesque courthouses of popular imagery, both statutory obligations and
Supreme Court interpretations of the due process clause require that these
agency-courts act much like traditional courts.22 In sum, a first packet of
changes stems from the creation of a range of federal judges, many of
whom lack life tenure and work in venues other than federal courthouses.
A second set of changes occurring over this century relates to trans-
formations in the functioning of the institution of the federal courts itself.
During the same period in which agencies functioned more like courts
when dealing with claimant disputes, the federal courts developed an insti-
tutional structure that has enabled them to act more like an agency. Today,
the federal judiciary functions as an entity that not only can organize itself
but that also can represent-and in practice define-its own interests.
The idea of "interest groups" is already a part of the discussion of the
utility of judicial independence. Some of the literature on judicial inde-
pendence posits that an independent judiciary can serve to arbitrate dis-
putes among special interests. 23 My point, in contrast, is that over this
century, the federal court system has gained a corporate structure enabling
it to function in some respects as an interest group.
A quick summary of the infrastructure and the agendas of the federal
courts is necessary as background to understanding why this transforma-
tion is relevant to the issue of judicial independence. In 1915, some 120
federal judges were dispersed across the United States, with, for example,
only a single district judge in Indiana or Maryland or Massachusetts.
24
These judges used different rules when deciding cases in their courts, and
they had no institutional means of talking with each other, let alone anyone
For a chart detailing the increase in kinds and quantity of matters handled by magistrate judges
through a comparison of their work in 1972, 1986, and 1994, see RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J.
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 52 (4th ed. 1988).
22. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (1988), discussed in
George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal
Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
23. See, e.g., Ferejohn, supra note 16, at 375-76; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
24. See 220 Federal Reporter nos. 5-7 (1915) (listing the district judges and their assignments).
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else. The Attorney General of the United States gave Congress reports on
the federal courts and asked Congress for the judiciary's funds. As then
Chief Justice William Howard Taft put it, each judge had "to paddle his
own canoe."
25
However, during the first half of the twentieth century, a group of re-
formers, comprised of judges, academics, and lawyers, undertook efforts to
make courts, both state and federal, more professional and to make the
federal courts into a national institution.26 Their work has rendered Taft's
boating image obsolete. In the 1920s, Congress created an official poli-
cymaking body of judges-now called the Judicial Conference of the
United States-through which twenty-seven judges, with the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court presiding, adopts official policy positions.27 The
Judicial Conference takes positions by voting on a range of subjects, such
as whether to support pending legislation. In 1939, at the behest of life-
tenured federal judges, Congress created the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, which collects data, submits budgets, and runs the
facilities for the federal court system.28 In 1967, Congress created another
judicial entity, the Federal Judicial Center, in order to focus on education
and research.29 Under Warren Burger's tenure, Chief Justices began to
make "state-of-the-judiciary" speeches. 30 In 1991, the judiciary set up an
Office of Judicial Impact Assessments to file "estimates" or predictions on
the effects of new causes of action on court dockets. 31 A few years there-
after, via a "futures-planning process," the Judicial Conference approved
ninety-three recommendations to Congress as part of an official document,
a first ever Long Range Plan, issued in 1995.32
In short, over the last few decades, the federal judiciary has become
an organization with some 2,000 judges, some 30,000 staff, and a budget
25. William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in Federal
Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 602 (1922).
26. See Zemans, supra note 1, at 628.
27. See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 838 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994))
(creating the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges).
28. See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, § 1, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§
601-612).
29. See Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. 90-219, § 6101, 81 Stat. 664 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 620-629).
30. See William Rehnquist, Chief Justice Recaps 1995 in Year-end Report, THIRD BRANCH,
Jan. 1996, at 1 (describing the tradition of making such remarks).
31. See CONFERENCE ON ASSESSING THE EFFECrS OF LEGISLATION ON THE WORKLOAD OF THE
COURTS: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 5-6 (A. Fletcher Mangum ed., Federal Judicial Center 1995).
32. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS (1995), reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN].
19991
HeinOnline -- 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 663 1998-1999
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:657
of two-tenths of one percent of the federal budget.33 As a corporate entity,
the federal judiciary educates, plans, lobbies, and opines about the shape,
nature, and future of judging. Turning to the positions taken in the last few
years, the federal judiciary has argued for limited growth in the number of
life-tenured judges, 34 expansion of the statutory federal judiciary,35 less
federal jurisdiction, 36 and a presumption against the creation of federal
rights if enforced in federal court.
3 7
A third set of changes during this century has occurred with respect to
the transformation of the roles of trial and appellate judges. Over the last
few decades, trial judges have redefined their roles by focusing on case
and lawyer management and by promoting settlement.38 I will not detail
that evolution here. Included are changes in the practices, rules, and the
self-conscious deployment of the federal judiciary as an educational insti-
tution that teaches judges what "good" judging means.3 9 Two recent illus-
trations capture the current judicial view of judging. Consider a recent
decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, which held
that a court-appointed mediator, working in an alternative dispute resolu-
tion program, was entitled to judicial immunity (that is, to protection from
33. See Omnibus Appropriations Bill a Mixed Bag for Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1998, at
1, 5 (describing "total [fiscal year] obligations of $4.06 billion for the Judiciary," and summarizing the
allocations to salaries, expenses, defender services, juror fees, and court security).
34. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 32, Recommendation 15, at 98 ("The growth of the Ar-
ticle III judiciary should be carefully controlled so that the creation of new judgeships, while not sub-
ject to a numerical ceiling, is limited to that number necessary to exercise federal court jurisdiction.").
35. See id., Recommendation 10, at 94 ("Where constitutionally permissible, Congress should
be encouraged to assign to administrative agencies or Article I courts the initial responsibility for ad-
judicating those categories of federal benefits or regulatory cases that typically involve intense fact-
finding."). See also id., Recommendation 65, at 161 ("Magistrate judges should perform judicial du-
ties to the extent constitutionally permissible and consistent with sound judicial policy.").
36. See id. at 83. Recommendation 1 provides:
Congress should be encouraged to conserve the federal courts as a distinctive judicial forum
of limited jurisdiction in our system of federalism. Civil and criminal jurisdiction should be
assigned to the federal courts only to further clearly defined and justified national interests,
leaving to the state courts the responsibility for adjudicating all other matters.
Id. See also id., Recommendations 2-5, at 84-88 (discussing criminal jurisdiction); id., Recommenda-
tions 6-10, at 88-94 (discussing civil jurisdiction).
37. See id., Recommendation 6, at 88 ("Congress should be encouraged to exercise restraint in
the enactment of new statutes that assign civil jurisdiction to the federal courts and should do so only
to further clearly defined and justified federal interests."). For explanation and analysis, see Judith
Resnik, Trial as Error- Transformations of the Federal Judiciary, Arthur Liman Professorship Inaugu-
ral Lecture, Yale Law School (Nov. 5, 1998) (manuscript on file with author).
38. See Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and
the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994); Judith
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
39. See Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional
Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 158-79 (1997).
HeinOnline -- 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 664 1998-1999
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ARTICLE III
a civil suit for damages). 40  The appellate court reasoned that what the
court-appointed mediator did was no different from what a judge might
have done.41 A second example comes from a district judge who, unhappy
about the trend toward the use of federal judges as conciliators, has argued
that the word "judge" should be used as a "verb as well as a noun and ad-
jective."
42
Turning to the appellate courts, I will also not provide great detail.
But, as many other commentators have shown, the appellate level has also
experienced significant transformations.43 As one federal appellate judge
recently reiterated, "Appellate courts now process criminal appeals rather
than decide them."'  That judge described members of the appellate bench
as more akin to administrators than judges because they supervise "law
clerks or indirectly... staff attorneys who delve into" cases. 45 This de-
scription is reflected in the aggregate data. Consider the difference be-
tween decisions of appellate courts and cases argued, or between deci-
sions and published opinions. As of 1997, of 51,000 cases that were
terminated, oral argument was held in one of five.46 Of 25,840 termina-
tions on the merits after oral argument or after briefs were submitted, some
40. See Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See also Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (holding that executive official performing adjudicative decisionmaking
had immunity from suit like a judge); Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886-
87 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding commercial organizations sponsoring contractual arbitration immune from
civil liability).
41. See Wagshal, 28 F.3d at 1252-54.
42 See Hon. William R. Wilson, Jr., Where Has All the Civility Gone?, ARK. TRIAL LAW.
MAO., Summer 1990, at 5.
43. See, e.g., William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996); Lauren K.
Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 891 (1993). See also Judith Resnik, Pre-
cluding Appeals, 70 CoRNELL L. REV. 603 (1985).
44. Hon. Carolyn Dineen King, Statement Before the Commission on Structural Alterna-
tives for the Federal Courts of Appeals Delivered Mar. 25, 1998 (visited Dec. 11, 1998)
<http://app.comm.uscourts.govlhearings/dallas/king.htm> (quoting a speech by Chief Justice
Rehnquist entitled "The Cult of the Robe" presented to the American Bar Association). Judge King
also described a practice in which "a panel of three judges sits [for a few days] to dispose of approxi-
mately thirty cases per day" and uses a "summary calendar," in which more than 50% of fully briefed
cases are decided by a rotation through three judges. Id. She commented that "as a practical mat-
ter,... these cases can easily become one-judge cases, with the other members of the screening panel
doing little more than reading the Staff Attorney's memo and the writing judge's proposed opinion."
Id.
45. Id.
46. See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 77 tbl.B-1 (reporting that of the total 51,194
dispositions, only 10,357 dispositions occurred after oral arguments). As is detailed therein, circuits
vary somewhat in the percentage of cases in which they hold oral argument.
1999]
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5,622 opinions were published; another 3,413 decisions went unpub-
lished.47
II. ALTERING THE MEANS OF PROTECTING FEDERAL
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
I have tracked a host of changes occurring in this century through
which the federal judiciary has emerged as a multi-tiered, variously staffed
organization. The federal judiciary functions as one of several venues of
federal adjudication. The judiciary focuses increasingly on dispute man-
agement and settlement. The judiciary has gained the capacity to act-vis-
h-vis Congress and the Executive-as a planning and agenda-setting entity
with the ability to develop and communicate its views.48  Now, let me
show the relevance of the diversification of federal judges, the revamping
of judicial processes, and the transformation of the federal judiciary into a
corporate entity to the topic of this symposium, judicial independence.
As often mentioned,"9 judicial independence includes at least two
distinct but sometimes blurred concepts: the role of a judiciary as a branch
of government, and the freedom of a judge to decide a case without fear of
retribution. 50 Take first the concept of judicial independence that relates to
separation of powers-a goal that is vivid in the federal system as well as
in some state systems,5' although not necessarily relevant in other coun-
tries.52 One could read the transformations of the last several decades as
enabling the federal judiciary to finally come "into its own" as a truly
separate branch of government. Through the Judicial Conference, the ju-
diciary can make policy. With the Administrative Office, the judiciary can
implement its own procedures and mandates, and, by means of the Federal
Judicial Center, it can educate and thereby perpetuate its views. These
structures, crafted by agreements of the judiciary and Congress (and with
47. See id. at 40 tbl.S-3. See also Judith Resnik, Statement Before the Commission on Struc-
tural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals Delivered Apr. 24, 1998 (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http://app.conun.uscourts.govlhearings/newyork/0427RES.htm.>.
48. For additional discussion, see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error. Transformations of the Federal
Judiciary over the Twentieth Century (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
49. See, e.g., Zemans, supra note 1, at 626-27; Burbank, supra note 14 at 339-49.
50. As to the desirability of that "liberty," see generally Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535 (1999).
51. See, e.g., The Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Remarks Before the American Bar Association
Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence (Dec. 13, 1996), in 12 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 69 (1996).
52. See Stevens, supra note 15 (noting that England lacks reliance on the judiciary as an inde-
pendent branch of government comparable to the role taken by the federal judiciary in the United
States).
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the acquiescence, and sometimes the support of the Executive), the judici-
ary has become (in contemporary parlance) "a player" on the federal poli-
cymaking scene.
But the trajectory is also complex. Over the last few decades, not
only has the judiciary come to function more like an agency, it has also
come to be treated-on some occasions-more like one. In the last few
years, Congress has queried the judiciary about use of courtrooms
(whether each judge should have a courtroom of his or her own), 53 judicial
time spent on travel and conferences, 54 and the size of its staff.
55
When confronted with such scrutiny, the federal judiciary responds as
might any agency seeking support from Congress; the federal judiciary has
provided detailed explanations of its needs and of its budgetary priorities
in an effort to demonstrate its capacity to economize. Federal judges,
nervous about the next questionnaire coming from Congress, appear ready
to placate and to mollify. As Ronald Garet might remind us,56 these are
not "Coverian judges" speaking truth to power,57 but realpolitik judges,
aiming to respond to and minimize conflict with those who fund their
budgets. (As one judge recently explained, one of the pressing problems
facing the federal judiciary in the coming years is how to pay the rent. The
federal courts have more than 500 facilities, for which they pay sums to
the General Services Administration. 58)
53. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-39, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION:
BETTER COURTROOM USE DATA COULD ENHANCE FACILITY PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING (1997);
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD 96-19, FEDERAL COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: MORE
DISCIPLINED APPROACH WOULD REDUCE COSTS AND PROVIDE FOR BETTER DECISiONMAKING (1995).
54. See Now the Judges Face the Questions, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 8 (describing re-
sponses by judges to questionnaires sent by Senator Charles E. Grassley, Chair of the Senate Judici-
ary's Oversight Committee); GAO Releases Report on Noncase-Related Travel by Judges, THIRD
BRANCH, Apr. 1998, at 6 (discussing a report, also requested by Senator Grassley, that reviewed "non-
case related trips" of 64 appellate and 254 district court judges "encompassing 3,200" appellate work-
days and 9,832 district court workdays, most of which were spent on court seminars and meetings).
55. See Courthouse Funding Delay Jeopardizes Judicial System, THIRD BRANCH, July 1998, at
1 (describing testimony by judges urging Congress to approve construction projects); Omnibus Bill
Funds Courthouses in 1999, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1998, at 1, 5 (describing the authorization and ap-
propriation of $460 million for 13 new projects and another $25 million for repairs, as well as the lack
of assistance from the White House in obtaining these funds).
56. See Ronald R. Garet, Judges as Prophets: A Coverian Interpretation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
385 (1999).
57. See Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV.
179 (1985); ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
58. According to staff at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 351 federal buildings
have courts and related functions such as probation and parole facilities, 68 other facilities are post
offices with courts, and another 289 facilities are leased. See Telephone Interview with staff in the
Office of the Space and Facilities Division of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(Nov. 1998).
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As I watch the interactions between Congress and the federal courts,59
I am struck by how much reliance there is on the good will of both
branches.60 . The Constitution provides few structural protections for the
judiciary as an entity. In conversations about judicial independence, a
common assumption is that Article III is not only the paradigm of inde-
pendence but also the pinnacle of how such independence can be achieved.
Yet, in terms of separation of powers, Article I looks thin. It provides
only for life tenure and individual salary protection, and misses the institu-
tional needs of a judiciary, functioning in an administrative state either as a
branch of government or as a provider of services to the millions of liti-
gants that seek its attention. As the judiciary transforms itself, in part to
meet those needs, it is ever more reliant on Congress-for staff, for surro-
gate and subsidiary judges, for its very ability to work, let alone to be a
player in governance.
Article Im is also "too little" from the second perspective (close to Dr.
Zemans' heart 61)--ensuring decisional integrity. Return to the needs for
federal adjudication, now provided by some 2,000 judges (statutory and
constitutional) within the Article mEI branch and another, larger number
outside it in administrative agencies. Assume, as I do, that the political
wherewithal or desire was never available to produce the 4,000 plus life-
tenured judges-the minimum number62 necessary to respond to the de-
mands of claimants contesting decisions relating to federal statutory en-
actments of this century. The life-tenured judiciary's reading of Article II
to permit judges lacking life tenure to make decisions has been a useful
adaption. The elasticity of Article Ill doctrine, with its now expansive
definition of who can hold the federal power of judging, enables disputants
to obtain adjudicatory decisionmaking in their many encounters with the
administrative state. One might thus applaud-or at least appreciate-the
consensus over these past decades between the federal courts and Congress
that has permitted the creation of federal judges other than life-tenured
judges.
59. See Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative
Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589 (1998).
60. See Ferejohn, supra note 16, at 356-57 (discussing the conditions under which the agree-
ment of mutual cooperation between the courts and Congress can be undone). My point is that the
vulnerability of the courts to Congress has grown over the past decades, that the judiciary is not only
dependent but increasingly so.
61. See Zemans, supra note 1.
62. That number is drawn from considering the numbers of contemporary non-life-tenured
judges in both courts and in agencies. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
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But, the judgeships thus manufactured exist outside of Article III, and
here again, Article III seems "too little." It does not articulate a concept of
judging sufficiently robust to cover the numbers of judges required to staff
contemporary adjudicatory procedures. How could these judges be
equipped with the power, authority, elan, sense of self and import pre-
sumed to enable wise and deliberate decisions? How are these judges to
be engaged in the public dialogue to which Dr. Zemans aspires? Given
that the federal system relies on structural protections of life tenure and
salary protections, can those mandates be translated into protections for
those "other" federal judges?
One possibility is that when making doctrinal interpretations of Arti-
cle III, life-tenured judges should condition the transfer of adjudicatory
authority from life-tenured judges on a concomitant transfer of some forms
of structured independence. For example, one might read the Constitution
as guaranteeing federal adjudicatory power with independence and requir-
ing any person holding the federal power of judgment to remain insulated
from attacks (such as dismissal based on decisions) and from pressures
(such as directives to resolve cases in a particular fashion).
Additionally, sources other than Article I can shore up the inde-
pendence of those federal judges who adjudicate outside its contours.
Some equipage may come from the impartiality mandates read into the due
process clause,63 common law doctrines such as immunities from suit, and
from the amalgam of constitutional and common law rights that guarantee
the public access to some adjudicatory proceedings. 6' If all kinds of fed-
eral judges have mandates to decide impartially and openly, if the public
has a presumptive place in the process (be it located in courts or agencies),
and if judges know that they have special protections from litigants un-
happy with their rulings but were subject to careful review by hierarchi-
cally superior judges, then perhaps those first tier judges will make more
careful, deliberate, and better reasoned judgments.
My purpose is to alter the focus by moving the discussion of judicial
independence beyond federal life-tenured judges, the level of their salaries,
their cost-of-living increases, and their stature. This shift will hopefully
allow the many sub-Article HI judges, who make decisions of great import
in the lives of many disputants, to share the iconic status of "judging."
With such judges in mind, it becomes plain that Article In provides (at
63. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 257-59
(1985).
64. See Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405 (1987).
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best) only a part of the equipage required. The expansive doctrinal work
sketched above might help generate forms of "cultural capital" for non-
life-tenured judges so that they see themselves-and become seen by oth-
ers-as significant actors obliged to be accountable for their decisionmak-
ing. What is needed is elaboration of the gestalt of judging for the sub-
Article III judges-one that takes them seriously, as the centrally impor-
tant decisionmakers in the United States polity that they are.
To do so, both law and practice must shift to enable such judges to
achieve and to merit that cultural capital. For example, if part of the ra-
tionale for judicial independence rests on the public aspect of judicial
work, "courts" in agencies provide little opportunity for such interactions.
Cases are heard in tiny hearing rooms with neither space nor plan for pub-
lic attendance. Decisions by many administrative law judges and hearing
officers are not routinely available to the public and can be found, if at all,
by labor-intensive scrutiny of transcripts or court files. Much work must
be done to take some of the equipage that belongs to the life-tenured fed-
eral judges and to some state court judges and expand its aegis to reach
low visibility state court judges, lower tier federal judges, and the adminis-
trative judiciary. Those judges, in turn, must reorient themselves to bring
the public into their work.
In some respects, such a project resembles efforts earlier in this cen-
tury to professionalize the judiciary, both in terms of its administrative ca-
pacity and of the behavior of lower echelon judges whose jobs frankly
were not held in high esteem. For example, one of the first "schools" for
judges was started in the 1940s by the American Bar Association in con-
junction with a department of Northwestern University to improve traffic
courts. 65 Parallel efforts were also made for family-court judges. Subse-
quently, the agendas of judicial education came to include the training of
appellate judges, 66 state trial court judges,67 federal district court judges, 68
and new Article HI judges about the norms of judging. 69
65. See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., NEW YORK UNIV., PRoIECT EFFECTIVE JUSTICE, AN
APPRAISAL 10-11 (1964).
66. See FANNIE J. KLEIN, CHANGING THE SYSTEM: THE TWENTY-FIVE YEAR CRUSADE OF THE
INSTITUTE FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION FOR EQUAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN COURTS, AN His.
TORICAL PROSPECTIVE (1977).
67. See V. Robert Payant, Ethical Training in the Profession: Tile Special Challenge of the Ju-
diciary, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 313 (1995) (providing the history of the National Judicial Col-
lege begun in 1963); Hon. Frank J. Murray, Trial Judges' College Influence Major Factor for Next
Generation, 1 TRIAL 75 (1964) (describing the classes).
68. See, e.g., Hon. Alfred P. Murrah, Foreword: Proceedings of the Seninar on Protracted
Cases for United States Circuit and District Judges, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1958) (discussing the education
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Those norms of judging are now in issue. What does the profession
of judging entail? Return to my point about the transformation of the role
of the federal district court judge, into settler, mediator, facilitator, and
case manager. Return to the D.C. Circuit opinion that confers judicial im-
munity on a mediator by explaining that a mediator and a judge have es-
sentially the same job.70 If both have the same job, which one gets life
tenure? The judge? The mediator? Both? Neither? If the job of a judge
is simply to manage a docket and settle cases privately, without reasons
and without public accountability, why should that job be granted consti-
tutional status and that person freed from risk of removal? Return also to
the transformations at the appellate level in which much of what is decided
is never reduced to a written document provided to the public.
The Federalist Papers explain that the judicial branch holds "merely"
the power of judgment.71 Dr. Zemans wants accountable judging and ar-
gues that the purpose of judicial independence exists to protect judges
when rendering decisions, thereby enabling them to remain loyal to the
rule of law.72 She wants judges to write better, clearer, less arrogant
opinions. I share her goals and admire her work, but I think the task is
harder for her-and for most of us-than it has been in the past. The ju-
dicial embrace of roles previously held by other social actors-the homog-
enization of different dispute resolvers-has made it more difficult to ex-
plain why judges (be they life-tenured or administrative law judges, in
federal or state courts) should be specially protected, specially insulated,
and specially respected. At issue is what forms of independence are ap-
propriate to the array of tasks now incorporated within "judging." In this
respect, Article III may be too much, rather than too little, in that it pro-
tects judges who have shifted their focus away from deliberate, difficult
decisionmaking and, while talking with litigants, render no judgments for
public review.
of district court judges to manage large-scale litigation).
69. See Hon. Alfred P. Murrah, Foreword: Reports of the Conference for District Court Judges,
59 F.R.D. 205 (1973); Proceedings of Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District Judges, 75
F.R.D. 89 (1976).
70. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
71. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
72. See Zemans, supra note 1, at 628.
1999]
HeinOnline -- 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 671 1998-1999
672 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
HeinOnline -- 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 672 1998-1999
